Georgia
After the armed conflict with Russia in 2008, the security situation in Georgia has been relatively stable.[1] However, as of 2022, reports state that law enforcement violations continue in the country.[2] Georgia has low levels of weapons and ammunition trafficking.[3] Due to the 2008 conflict and lack of access to certain areas, landmines and unexploded ordnance remain in the country (the exact extent is unknown).[4]
The OSCE, the United States European Command, Golden West Humanitarian Foundation, the HALO Trust and ITF Enhancing Human Security are on the ground to help with the through-life management of ammunition in collaboration with the Georgian Ministry of Defence. Efforts have included Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM) trainings, site assessments, technical advisory support for Ammunition National Regulatory development, and explosive ordnance clearance.[5]
[1] “BTI 2022 Georgia Country Report.” BTI 2022. Accessed July 14, 2022. https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/GEO.
[2] “World Report 2022: Georgia Events of 2021.” Human Rights Watch. Accessed July 13, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/georgia.
[3] “Guns in Georgia.” Gun Law and Policy: Firearms and armed violence, country by country. Accessed July 13, 2022. https://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/georgia.
[4] “Georgia.” The HALO Trust. Accessed July 14, 2022. https://www.halotrust.org/where-we-work/europe-and-caucasus/georgia/. “Georgia.” Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor. Accessed July 14, 2022. http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2020/georgia/mine-action.aspx.
[5] See A-MAP Database.
Launch the country dashboard
Further information
Accidental explosions
Since the beginning of data collection in 1979 by the Small Arms Survey, four accidental explosions were reported in Georgia (Table 1).
Table. 1 Accidental explosions in Georgia (1979-2021)
Year | Location | Owner/manager | Deaths | Injuries |
2017 | Primorskoye | Non-state (actor) | 2 | 64 |
2009 | Akhalgori | Foreign (intervention) | N/A | N/A |
2008 | Tskhinvali | Foreign (intervention) | N/A | N/A |
1996 | Osiauri | State (military) | N/A | N/A |
Source: Small Arms Survey. n.d. Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites (UEMS). Database.
Cases of diversion
Some cases of diversion have been reported since 2000 in Georgia (Table 2).
Table 2: Cases of diversion of arms, ammunition, and explosives in Georgia since 2000
Year | Location | Description |
2006 | N/A | Sources say that from 1996 to 2006, there were approximately seven thefts from military barracks (a few dozen guns and less than ten grenade launchers). |
2005 | Vaziani | Battle-tank machineguns were stolen from a military base. |
Source: “Mod Declines Comment on Reported Robbery at Tank Repair Factory.” Civil.Ge, October 26, 2005. https://old.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=11048. Wood, David. "Taking Stock: Small Arms and Human Security in Georgia." Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development and Saferworld, September 2006. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/32359/Taking%20Stock%20Small%20Arms.pdf.
Disposal
Destruction, use, or export of ammunition as an indicator of a state’s ability to identify and decrease aging, unsafe, or surplus ammunition.
Insufficient information on the disposal of ammunition in Georgia.
Needs
Further requirements for an effective through-life management of ammunition in the country.
To further enhance safe and secure ammunition management, the following need has been identified for Georgia:
- Development or refinement of standards and procedures on stockpile management (need for legal assistance to develop new legislation in accordance with EU standards)
Source: PoA Report 2018, Georgia. Please note that PoA reports focus on SALW and not specifically on ammunition. https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/reports/GEO-English-71-SUBMITTED.pdf.
