Libya has experienced armed conflict since 2011 and the current political and military situation is not improving. A myriad of armed groups is involved.1 Due to this ongoing armed violence, it is highly difficult to implement ammunition management policies in the country. Libya suffers from very high levels of weapons and ammunition trafficking2 and it is also highly contaminated with landmines and other types of unexploded ordnance.3
The African Union, UNMAS, the Small Arms Survey, and BICC are on the ground to help with the through-life management of ammunition in collaboration with UNSMIL. Efforts have included the disposal of ammunition and explosive remnants of war, providing technical advice and completing construction at a missile fuel storage site, training police forces in Physical Security and Stockpile Management (PSSM), and translating key PSSM documents into Arabic for wider diffusion in Libya.4
1“Libya: A Short Guide to the Conflict.” Rulac. Accessed June 24, 2022. https://www.rulac.org/publications/libya-a-short-guide-to-the-conflict.
2“Guns in Libya.” Gun Law and Policy: Firearms and armed violence, country by country. Accessed June 24, 2022. https://www.gunpolicy.org/firearms/region/libya.
3“Libya: Impact.” Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, March 26, 2021. http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2021/libya/impact.aspx.
4See AMAP Dataset.
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Further information
Accidental explosions
Since the beginning of data collection in 1979 by the Small Arms Survey, numerous accidental explosions were reported in Libya.
Table. 1 Accidental explosions in Libya (1979-2021)
Year | Location | Owner/manager | Deaths | Injuries |
2020 | Tripoli | Non-state (actor) | N/A | N/A |
2016 | Garabulli | Non-state (actor) | 30 | 24 |
2013 | Brak al-Chati | State (military) | 40 | N/A |
2013 | Brak al-Chati | State (military) | 10 | 4 |
2012 | Ad Dafiniya | Non-state (actor) | 1 | 1 |
2012 | Sirte | Non-state (actor) | 7 | N/A |
2011 | Ar-Rajma | Non-state (actor) | 27 | 20 |
2011 | Benghazi | Non-state (actor) | 0 | 0 |
2011 | Tripoli | State (military) | N/A | N/A |
2011 | Tripoli | N/A | 10 | N/A |
Source: Small Arms Survey. n.d. Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites (UEMS). Database.
Cases of diversion
Various cases of diversion have been reported since 2000 in Libya (Table 2).
Table 2: Cases of diversion of arms, ammunition, and explosives in Libya since 2000
Year | Location | Description |
2015 | Sirte | A Polish Kbk-AKMS rifle was seized in Sirte. Analyses say that it is likely to have come from Libyan military stockpiles. |
2014 | N/A | Belgian- and French-manufactured 60 mm and 81 mm mortar rounds match some found in Sebha, Libya. Analyses say it is likely that they came from former Libyan stockpiles. |
2012 | N/A | The cargo ship Letfallah II was intercepted in Lebanon. Within it were various weapons and ammunition from the former government stockpiles of Libya. Such weapons included Russian-manufactured SA-24 surface-to-air missiles and 7.62 x 54R mm calibre rifles. |
Source: Conflict Armament Research. “Diversion Digest.” Published in December 2020. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjcw9OazM34AhUzi_0HHe5MD7oQFnoECAwQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.conflictarm.com%2Fdownload-file%2F%3Freport_id%3D3343%26file_id%3D3351&usg=AOvVaw3fWgZZkQIcmL2erKKf45sc. Conflict Armament Research. “Investigating Cross-border Weapon Transfers in the Sahel.” Published in November 2016. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjcw9OazM34AhUzi_0HHe5MD7oQFnoECAcQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.conflictarm.com%2Freports%2Finvestigating-cross-border-weapon-transfers-in-the-sahel%2F&usg=AOvVaw1pgCUfRoYU6Obs_YVG6bVS.
Disposal
Insufficient information on the disposal of ammunition in Libya.
Needs
No needs have been reported for Libya.
Source: PoA Report 2010, Libya. Please note that PoA reports focus on SALW and not specifically on ammunition. https://unoda-poa.s3.amazonaws.com/poa-reports-le/2010%40112%40PoA-Lybia-2010-E.doc